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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 99-5251 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL DULIGA 
 
       Appellant 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
D.C. No.: 96-cr-326 
District Judge: Honorable Nicholas H. Politan 
 
Before: GREENBERG, ROTH, and ROSENN, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 25, 2000 
 
(Filed February 10, 2000) 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction and 
sentence in the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey in connection with telemarketing operations. 
The defendant, who was convicted on a multi-count 
indictment charging conspiracy to commit mail and wire 
frauds, contends that in imposing sentence, the district 
 
 
 
 
court incorrectly determined his base level offense under 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines by attributing to 
him the entire amount of loss generated by the conspiracy 
rather than the amount of loss he generated through his 
own telemarketing efforts. 
 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3742 and will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
A. The Telemarketing Scam 
 
In December of 1990, Rita Holz, her husband Julius 
Schurkman, and a third person, Adie Lipton, set up All-Win 
Financial Corporation in Del Rey Beach, Florida. The 
company began operations in January of 1991. It then 
placed advertisements in newspapers across the nation 
advertising personal loans and debt consolidation. No 
advertisements, however, were placed locally. All-Win 
wished to avoid face-to-face confrontations with disgruntled 
clients. 
 
The advertisements offered loans of up to $10,000, even 
to those with acute credit problems, and included a toll-free 
telephone number. When a prospective applicant called the 
toll-free number, a telemarketer would solicit basic 
background information from the applicant, including 
name, social security number, and any credit problems. 
The telemarketer would then ask the applicant to call back 
in approximately one hour so the loan could be processed. 
When the applicant called back, the telemarketer would 
congratulate the applicant and tell him that he had 
qualified for the loan. Of course, no processing occurred 
during that interval, and the time lapse between calls was 
merely pretextual. 
 
After "approving" the applicant on the telephone, the 
telemarketer would then give the applicant an express mail 
or Federal Express number and tell the applicant to use the 
number to send All-Win its $199 application fee. Once All- 
Win received the fee, it forwarded the applicant's name, 
 
                                2 
 
 
along with a $25 fee, to North American Acceptance 
Exchange ("NAAE"). NAAE was not a real lender, but was a 
"denial mill." NAAE helped create the illusion that the loan 
process was legitimate by sending loan application papers 
to the applicants. The loan application was sent to the 
applicants to string them along and add to the illusion of 
legitimacy. Upon completing the application and mailing it 
to NAAE, or another denial mill used by All-Win, the 
applicant would ultimately receive a rejection letter. 
 
In June of 1991, All-Win experienced "legal problems" 
and decided to relocate to Cherry Hill, New Jersey. Holz 
undertook the majority of the relocation effort. She rented 
space, obtained phone lines, and set up a new company 
under the name A-1. By July of 1991, the telemarketing 
scam was up and running again and continued to utilize 
the same procedures as All-Win, except that the application 
fee increased to $249. A-1 remained in business until 
November of 1991. By that time, A-1 and All-Win had 
defrauded their "clients" of approximately $1.2 million. 
 
B. The Defendant's Role in the Telemarketing Scam 
 
The defendant, Daniel Duliga, joined the All-Win 
telemarketing scam in January of 1991, shortly after the 
company commenced operations. All-Win generally 
employed eight to ten telemarketers at any one time, and 
Duliga, like the other telemarketers, worked in a single, 
large room using a script provided by All-Win. A daily tally 
was kept of the application fees received, and all of the 
telemarketers, including Duliga, were aware that All-Win 
was not engaged in a legitimate business endeavor. The 
telemarketers often spoke freely of the fraudulent nature of 
their employment and joked about the gullible people from 
whom they received application fees. Duliga even admitted 
to a Postal Inspector that within the first week of his 
employment at All-Win he realized that All-Win was not 
processing any loans and that the individuals requesting 
the loans never received them. 
 
Despite his awareness of All-Win's illegitimacy, Duliga 
developed into one of All-Win's top telemarketers and the 
company frequently called upon him to train newly 
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recruited telemarketers. For his efforts, he received both a 
salary and commissions. In addition, when All-Win decided 
to relocate to New Jersey in June of 1991, Holz and the 
other principals requested that Duliga join them in setting 
up the new business. Holz testified that she considered the 
talents of Duliga, as well as those of two other experienced 
telemarketers, crucial to a successful relocation. She even 
sought their opinions when determining where to relocate 
the business. 
 
Duliga agreed to join the telemarketing operation in 
Cherry Hill, New Jersey and continued to work as a 
telemarketer for the newly established A-1 until November 
1991. During his employment with the two companies, 
Duliga earned over $42,000 in salary and commissions and 
generated application fees in excess of $150,000. 
 
C. Procedural History 
 
On June 4, 1996, a federal grand jury sitting in New 
Jersey returned a twenty-six count indictment against 
Duliga and several other individuals. Count I charged 
Duliga and the others with conspiracy to commit mail and 
wire fraud, contrary to 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 and 1343, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371. Counts II through VI charged 
him and the others with mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
SS 1341 and 1342. Counts VII through XV charged him and 
the others with wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 1343 
and 1342. Prior to trial, the United States Attorney 
dismissed several counts of the indictment and proceeded 
against Duliga only on counts I through VIII and counts XI 
through XV. The jury found Duliga guilty on all of these 
remaining counts. 
 
On March 25, 1999, the court imposed sentence in 
accordance with the presentence report recommendation. 
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. S2F1.1(a), Duliga received a base 
offense level of six. Because the loss generated by the 
telemarketing scam was more than $800,000 but less than 
$1.5 million, Duliga received an eleven level increase in his 
base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1)(L). He 
also received an additional two level increase under 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(2) because the offense involved more 
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than minimal planning. Duliga's final offense level was 19 
and his criminal history category was II, which resulted in 
an imprisonment range of 33 to 41 months. The district 
court sentenced him to 33 months' imprisonment, three 
years' supervised release, and a special assessment of 
$650. 
 
II. 
 
On appeal, Duliga contends that the district court 
incorrectly determined his base offense level by attributing 
to him the entire amount of loss generated by the 
conspiracy (approximately $1.2 million) rather than the 
amount of loss he generated through his own telemarketing 
efforts (approximately $155,000). "When reviewing the 
sentencing decisions of the district courts, `[w]e exercise 
plenary review over legal questions about the meaning of 
the sentencing guidelines, but apply the deferential clearly 
erroneous standard to factual determinations underlying 
their application.' " See United States v. Fuentes, 954 F.2d 
151, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Inigo, 
925 F.2d 641, 658 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 
III. 
 
Under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(a), a defendant convicted of a 
crime of fraud receives a base offense level of six. This 
offense level, however, is subject to increase depending on 
the amount of loss generated by the fraud. See U.S.S.G. 
S 2F1.1(b); see also United States v. Boatner, 99 F.3d 831, 
835 (3d Cir. 1996). In calculating the amount of loss 
generated by the fraud, a sentencing court obviously may 
include amounts directly attributable to the fraudulent 
conduct of the defendant. See U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). In 
addition, where, as here, the crime of fraud for which the 
defendant has been convicted involves jointly undertaken 
criminal activity, the sentencing court may also attribute to 
the defendant amounts of loss resulting from the 
"reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in 
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity." See 
U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); see also Boatner, 99 F.3d at 835. 
However, to do so, the loss resulting from the acts or 
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omissions of others must be: (1) in furtherance of the 
jointly undertaken activity; (2) within the scope of the 
defendant's agreement; and (3) reasonably foreseeable in 
connection with the criminal activity the defendant agreed 
to undertake. See United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 
254 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 732 
(3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 995 
(3d Cir. 1992).1 
 
Applying this test, we believe that the district court 
correctly included the entire amount of the loss generated 
by the telemarketing scam when determining Duliga's 
offense level.2 
 
First, all of the losses generated by All-Win and A-1 were 
in furtherance of the jointly undertaken activity. The goal of 
these two companies, and those who worked for them, was 
to produce as many fraudulent application fees as possible. 
All of the telemarketers used the same script to accomplish 
this goal, and all of the telemarketers were aware of the 
companies' fraudulent nature. 
 
Second, all of the losses generated by All-Win and A-1 
were within the scope of Duliga's agreement. He learned 
during his first week of work at All-Win that All-Win was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As a preliminary matter, Duliga suggests that the Second Circuit's 
decision in United States v. Studley, 47 F.3d 569 (2d. Cir. 1995)(holding 
that the Guidelines require that a district court make a particularized 
finding as to the scope of the criminal activity agreed upon by a 
defendant and outlining the factors relevant to such a finding), should 
guide our disposition of this case. However, we think the resolution of 
this case is governed by this Court's decision in Collado and therefore 
adhere to the wisdom of that case. 
 
2. We note that the district court did not necessarily undertake a 
searching and individualized inquiry before attributing the entire amount 
of loss generated by All-Win and A-1 to Duliga. See Collado, 975 F.2d at 
995. However, because we are convinced that the attribution of that loss 
is firmly supported by the record, we see no reason to remand this case 
only to have the district court reach the same sentencing decision. See 
id. at 997 ("The district court made no findings regarding the propriety 
of attributing to one brother sales made by the other, but after reviewing 
the transcripts of the telephone calls cited in the presentence 
investigation report, we are convinced that this instance of accomplice 
attribution was justified."). 
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not a legitimate venture, yet he continued to defraud 
individuals into believing that their application fees would 
materialize into loans. He also received a substantial salary 
from the companies, not just commissions based on his 
own application fees. Therefore, he possessed a stake in the 
success of the companies as a whole. Moreover, although 
Duliga characterizes himself as merely an employee that 
agreed to telemarket for the principals, the evidence plainly 
contradicts this characterization. Duliga was one of the top 
three telemarketers for the two companies, and when, the 
All-Win principals decided to relocate to New Jersey as A-1, 
they considered Duliga's assistance in the relocation 
crucial. Duliga clearly understood the illegal objectives of 
All-Win and A-1 and agreed to use his best efforts to 
further those objectives. 
 
Third, all of the losses generated by All-Win and A-1 were 
reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal 
activity Duliga agreed to undertake. All of the 
telemarketers, including Duliga, worked side by side in one 
large room, and the telemarketers frequently joked about 
the naive applicants from whom they received application 
fees. Moreover, a daily tally was kept of the application fees 
received. Thus, far from being unforeseeable, the losses 
generated by All-Win and A-1 were within Duliga's plain 
view. 
 
In sum, the evidence readily demonstrates that Duliga 
was a key player in the telemarketing scam from its 
inception to its conclusion and that the losses generated by 
that scam were reasonably foreseeable in connection with 
the scope of the criminal activity Duliga agreed to jointly 
undertake. He was more than aware of the scope of the 
operation and of its fraudulent character. Therefore, the 
district court committed no error in attributing them to 
Duliga. 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence of 
the district court will be affirmed. 
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